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Monopsony Power, Pay Structure and Training
* 
 
Although interest in monopsonistic influences on labour market outcomes has revived in 
recent years, only a few empirical studies provide direct evidence on it. This paper analyses 
empirically the effect of monopsony power on pay structure, using a direct measure of labour 
market ‘thinness’. We find that having fewer competitors for skilled labour is associated at the 
level of the establishment with lower pay for both skilled labour and trainees, but not for 
unskilled labour. These findings have potentially important implications for the economic 
theory of training, as most recent models assume that skilled pay is set monopsonistically but 
both unskilled and trainee pay are determined competitively. Our results support those 
assumptions for skilled pay and unskilled pay, but not for trainee pay. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent renewal of interest in monopsony power in the labour market is indicated by the 
various articles introduced by Ashenfelter, Farber and Ransom (2010).  
Monopsony power is present when the firm faces an upward-sloping labour supply curve, 
which gives it the power to set the wage, in contrast to its impotence if faced by the perfectly 
elastic supply curve of perfect competition. Monopsony was initially thought of in literal 
terms, as a single buyer in an isolated labour market, and judged correspondingly rare in 
practice. However, an individual firm can still face an upward-sloping supply curve even 
when other firms in the labour market compete with it for labour, whether because of fewness 
of competitors (oligopsony), a dispersion of both jobs and workers in terms of location and 
non-wage attributes (classic differentiation), or the costs of either geographical mobility or 
search-related information (Boal and Ransom 1997).  
Indeed, while the classic source of monopsony power – few competing firms and/or collusion 
by employers – might not at first sight seem especially relevant to modern labour markets, 
recent theories of monopsony power essentially involve the same assumption. Even when 
many employers are present in a labour market, the other factors may mean that individual 
workers face „few employment opportunities‟, because of the costs of locating vacancies or 
travelling  to  distant  locations,  which  means  that  labour  markets  are  effectively  „thin‟ 
(Manning, 2003a: 106-108).  
Much of the evidence of monopsony power has been indirect, involving aspects of wage 
dispersion,  the  finance  of  work-based  training,  pay  differences  by  race  and  sex,  and  the 
effects of changes in statutory minimum wages (Bhaskar, Manning and To 2002). Recent 
research has focused on more direct evidence, in terms of the elasticity of labour supply to 
individual firms (e.g., Ransom and Sims 2010; Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs 2010).  
A second, longer-standing potential source of direct evidence is the association between pay 
and buyer concentration across local labour markets: does the presence of fewer employers 
mean lower pay? Boal and Ransom (1997) noted the absence of empirical consensus on the 
issue, even in markets for skilled labour that might be expected to be monopsonistic, notably 
school-teachers and hospital nurses. Some older studies, including Bunting (1962) and Hirsch 2 
 
and Schumacher (1995), found little or no evidence that wages are lower in markets with 
fewer employers; others, including Link and Landon (1976), evidence that they are. Boal and 
Ransom (1997) attributed the weak pattern of results to the availability of only variable and 
partial  controls  for  heterogeneity  across  localities  in  other  potential  determinants  of  pay, 
notably in workers‟ living costs and in the attributes of employers. In particular, they pointed 
to the tendency for pay to be inversely associated with fewness of employers in unskilled 
occupations as well. As such markets might be expected to behave competitively, the same 
association suggests that the apparent effect of fewness of employers is actually caused by the 
difficulty of delineating local labour markets empirically and controlling statistically for their 
attributes.  However,  as  that  inference  is  itself  not  well  established  empirically,  the  issue 
should remain open. 
This paper adopts the latter approach, analysing the effects of fewness of firms across local 
labour markets. We analyse the association between pay and fewness of employers across 
local labour markets in a wide range of occupations, unskilled and skilled. We first establish 
evidence of a fewness effect on pay in skilled labour markets but not in unskilled ones. Then 
we  analyse  the  association  between  fewness  and  the  pay  differentials  between  skilled 
employees,  unskilled  employees,  and  trainees  within  an  establishment.  This  specification 
potentially  controls  for  heterogeneity  of  firms  and  local  living  costs.  We  find  that  skill 
differentials  are  higher  in  local  labour  markets  with  fewer  employers,  and,  given  that 
uncontrolled differences in  living costs and employer  attributes  are unlikely to  matter  as 
much for intra-firm pay differentials as for absolute pay levels, we interpret that association 
as evidence of monopsony power. Furthermore, we find that monopsony power is associated 
more with the number of local competitors in the same sector rather than the number in all 
sectors, which suggests that our results are not due to the overall level of economic activity in 
the locality. 
An analysis of monopsony in relation to skill differentials in pay is economically interesting 
in its own right as well. Contemporary models of the finance of work-based training interpret 
evidence that employers share the cost of general training, which they could not do under 
perfect competition, in terms of an assumption that firms have monopsony power over skilled 
labour, but not over unskilled labour. The result is „wage compression‟ between skilled and 
unskilled labour, i.e., a smaller growth in pay than in marginal product as an employee‟s skill 3 
 
is increased by training. Wage compression in turn provides the incentive to and opportunity 
for firms to bear the costs of training (Stevens 1994; Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a).  
This central assumption has lacked direct evidence, and relied instead on indirect evidence 
such as the distribution of training costs, and the relationships between pay, post-training 
separations and recruitment in markets for skilled labour (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). The 
validity of that assumption may however be limited, particularly when unskilled employees 
and  trainees  are  distinguished,  and  the  possibility  of  monopsony  power  over  trainees  is 
allowed (Wolter and Ryan 2010). 
Our evidence concerns Switzerland, a country whose training system closely resembles the 
German one, from which influential conclusions have been drawn about monopsony power, 
pay structure, and training volume (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; Dustmann and Schönberg 
2009). We analyse a representative data set for 3,500 establishments in Switzerland in 2004, 
into  which  have  been  merged  the  attributes  of  the  local  labour  markets  in  which  those 
establishments  are  located.  We  consider  pay  within  the  largest  category  of  skilled 
employment, at detailed occupation level, at the establishment, relative both to trainees in the 
same  occupation  and  to  unskilled  employees.  The  results  represent  a  wide  range  of 
occupations, not just the particular ones (e.g., nurses) or the broad ones (e.g., white collar 
workers)  that  dominate  the  literature.  We  find  evidence  of  significant  monopsonistic 
influence  on  the  pay  of  both  skilled  workers  and  trainees,  but  not  on  that  of  unskilled 
workers.  
The  next  section  discusses  analytically  issues  concerning  monopsony  power  in  labour 
markets. Section 3 outlines the sources of our data. In section 4 we outline our estimation 
strategy. Section 5 presents the results for the effects of monopsony on, first, the firm‟s pay 
level and pay structure in general, and, second, on training-related pay structure in firms that 
provide formal training. The conclusions come in section 6. 
 
2. Economics of monopsony 
What  generates  buyer  power  in  the  labour  market,  and  what  are  its  effects  on  pay, 
employment and training? 4 
 
2.1 Pay setting and employment 
The idea of monopsony may best be illustrated by the question asked in Manning (2003b : 3): 
“What happens if an employer cuts the wage it pays its workers by one cent?”. Assuming 
perfect competition, all workers immediately leave the firm, as implied by the law of one 
wage. However, if not all would leave, the firm can create a rent by lowering wages below 
the competitive level. The literal case of monopsony is a single buyer in a particular labour 
market (Robinson 1933). The stereotypical example is a small coal mining town with no 
employers beside the mining firm, which gives the latter wage-setting power similar to the 
price-setting power a monopolist enjoys in a product market.  
However, instances of literal monopsony are rare or non-existent. More plausibly, only a few 
employers may compete for  a particular type of labour in a locality, in which case each 
oligopsonist  enjoys  monopsony  power  without  being  a  strict  monopsonist.  Although 
outcomes  under  oligopsony  are  a  priori  indeterminate,  in  the  sense  of  being  sensitive  to 
assumptions  about  behaviour  in  the  face  of  strategic  interdependence,  in  some  models, 
notably Cournot competition, an equilibrium exists in which the presence of fewer employers 
is associated with lower pay. Similarly, even if collusion is more important in practice than 
economists have tended to believe, the scope for its success, i.e., attaining the low wage of 
literal monopsony, increases as the number of oligopsonists declines, thereby reducing the 
benefit to the firm of breaking rank and increasing the visibility to other firms of its having 
done so (Boal and Ransom 1997; Manning 2010). 
Even  interpreted  in  terms  of  oligopsony,  the  importance  of  monopsony  power  might  be 
doubted given the large numbers of employers that function in many modern labour markets. 
Recent work emphasises however the potential relevance of monopsony power even in such 
contexts (Manning 2003b; Ashenfelter et al. 2010). Inelasticity in the supply of labour to the 
firm may be expected to result from frictions in the labour market – notably from the costs to 
workers of information about job vacancies and the costs of geographical mobility, and also 
from dispersion in job attributes and worker preferences concerning travel costs and other 
non-wage amenities (type of work, social ties, etc.; Boal and Ransom 1997). For example, 
workers who face substantial travel-to-work costs refuse a more distant job when the wage 
gain from changing jobs is less than increased cost of getting to and from work (Bhaskar and 
To 1999; Manning 2003a). Alternatively, if job search is taken to be costly, not least because 5 
 
vacancies are scarce, workers may not be aware of alternative job opportunities in the first 
place. Under such conditions, the labour market remains „thin‟ from the worker‟s perspective, 
and the firm  faces  a rising supply price of labour, even when many employers formally 
compete in the same labour market (Manning 2010).  
Examined in more detail, the first class of models involves „classic differentiation‟: i.e., the 
dispersion  of  job  attributes  and  worker  preferences  in  general,  and  those  concerning 
geographical location in particular. As a result of fixed costs of market entry, firms do not 
exist at all places in geographical space and jobs are therefore differentiated in the eyes of 
workers  by  their  distance  from  the  worker‟s  home  –  a  form  of  product  differentiation 
analysed  by  Salop  (1979).  Assuming  non-trivial  travel-to-work  costs,  the  geographical 
heterogeneity of jobs and workers then gives the firm market power over workers who live 
nearby (Bhaskar and To, 1999; Hamilton, Thisse and Zenou 2000; Brueckner, Thisse and 
Zenou 2002).
1  
The second  class of model involves the economics of job search ( Burdett and Mortenson 
1998). In these models, jobs are assumed to be identical, and workers will now leave their 
employers for another job if the wage exceeds their current wage. The problem is the 
difficulty of finding such an employer , given the cost of job search.  Monopsony power is 
high when the arrival  rate of job offers is low  – as it is when search costs are high. The 
supply of labour to the firm increases with its wage, in that firms that pay higher wages lose 
fewer employees to their competitors.  In equilibrium, where employment is constant, the 
flow of new hires is equal to the flow of workers leaving the firm. The number of quits that a 
firm avoids by offering higher pay is equal to the number of recruits it attracts. The firm‟s 
elasticity of labour supply can be estimated from the association between its wage and its 
separation and recruitment rates, with a potentially important difference between the short 
run and the long run (Manning 2003b, Manning 2006). The low elasticities reported in recent 
research
2 require search costs so hig h as to suggest not that any higher wage job can be 
                                                           
1 Thus Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs (2010) find that deregulation-generated wage increases at particular hospitals 
affected pay at other hospitals in the same locality, but had little effect on their employment, which suggests 
considerable monopsony power in local labour markets for nurses. 
2 A number of recent studies have adopted this very approach to obtain empirical estimates of the labour supply 
elasticity. Ransom and Sims (2010) estimate the labour supply elasticity for school teachers in Missouri of 3.7, 
which implies that school districts possess significant monopsony power . Hirsch, Schank and Schnabel (2010) 
report elasticities ranging from 1.9 to 3.7 in the German labour market, with women‟s elasticity being always 
lower compared to men‟s. Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) find an elasticity ranging from 2.4–3 for male and 1.5–
2.5 for female workers in a regional grocery retailer located in the United States. 6 
 
obtained  by  any  job  searcher,  but  rather  that  vacancies  themselves  are  scarce  (Manning 
2010). 
2.2 Monopsony power and training 
Monopsony power holds centre stage in the economics of work-based training. Mainstream 
models
3  address what had previously been seen as an anomaly in human capital theory  
(Becker 1964):  employers‟  investments  in  „general‟  skills  (Dionisius  et  al.  2009),  which 
could  not  happen  in  perfect  competition.  The  anomaly  can  be  explained  by  assuming 
imperfect competition, in the shape of monopsony power for employers over skilled labour, 
and, in particular, of greater monopsony power over skilled than unskilled labour. That paired 
assumption generates wage compression, defined as a growth with the amount of training 
received in marginal product that exceeds that in pay. Given wage compression, employers 
maximise  profits  by  reducing  unskilled  employment  in  favour  of  skilled  employment; 
training provides the link between the two adjustments (Stevens 1994, 2001; Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Dustmann and Schönberg 2009).
4  
The assumption that monopsony power applies to skille d workers is typically justified  in 
terms of an underlying heterogeneity of employers. Stevens (1994) assumes that the content 
of skill requirements in any given occupation differs across employers, and that the value to 
other employers of a firm‟s skilled workers is therefore less than their value to the firm itself, 
which has trained them for its own requirements exactly. 
By contrast, the typical assumption about pay setting for  unskilled workers  and trainees, 
whether implicit or explicit, is perfect competition, which equalises marginal products and 
pay across employers. „Free entry at the start of period 1 makes that w1
 [trainee pay] is set 
such as to drive expected profits to zero‟ (Leuven 2005: 97).
5 The assumption corresponds to 
                                                           
3 For a recent survey article see Leuven (2005). 
4 Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) note that even if the monopsony -based rate of exploitation (ratio of marginal 
product to the wage) is the same for trainees as for skilled workers, the firm‟s absolute surplus is greater for the 
skilled worker, which creates some incentive to provide training. 
5  See also Winkelmann (1996), Chang and Wang (1996) and Stevens (1999: 21). Acemoglu and   Pischke 
(1999b) also analyse a „fully competitive‟ regime, in which the firm pays trainees only what is necessary to 
obtain their services, while competition for trainees denies the firm any super-normal profits. They do however 
also analyse two alternatives, a „constrained‟ and a „cooperative‟ regime, in which trainees cannot or will not 
accept the competitive level of pay, though the source and feasibility of such non-competitive behaviour is not 
stated. 7 
 
an expectation that unskilled workers are equally valuable to employers across the entire 
range of sectors and job tasks.  
This pair of contrasting assumptions – monopsony for skilled labour, perfect competition for 
unskilled labour and trainees – has become the norm in the training literature. That status may 
be attributable partly to those models‟ central prediction, viz. that employers rationally incur 
costs for „general‟ training, and partly to the analytical simplification that the assumptions 
permit. In any case, the paired assumptions are widely viewed as having general applicability 
(Manning 2003b: 304). 
That view may however be unwarranted. Some evidence suggests monopsony in markets for 
trainee  labour.  The  surpluses  earned  during  training  by  some  German  and  many  Swiss 
employers suggest less than perfectly competitive markets for trainee labour (Dionisius et al. 
2009). Similarly, the effectiveness of the episodic episodes of industrial action conducted by 
apprentices  in  British  metalworking  industry  in  the  last  century  is  inconsistent  with  the 
assumption of perfect competition for trainee labour, but consistent with monopsony (Ryan 
2010).  
Manning  (2003b:  302-5)  observes  that  monopsony  power  may  not  only  be  present  over 
unskilled workers and trainees, it may even be stronger than over skilled workers. He sees a 
potential cause in a higher rate of recent labour market entry among young trainees, resulting 
in lower wage elasticities of separations and accessions than among adults.  
Greater monopsony power over trainee labour than over skilled labour may be expected from 
other attributes of the two groups too. When trainees are young (teenagers or young adults) 
and living with and subsidised by their parents, the costs of geographical mobility tend to be 
proportionately higher for them than for adult employees, which increases their dependence 
on local employers, and which, if local employers are few, generates greater monopsony 
power. Secondly, although younger workers have the incentive (because of a longer expected 
working life) to invest more in labour market search, matching and mobility than do older 
ones, their inexperience may still mean a smaller stock of accumulated information, and with 
it more dependence on their current employer. 8 
 
Conversely, other factors may make monopsony power weaker over trainees than over other 
workers. As trainees are typically young, they may have more alternatives to wage-earning – 
including full-time education and family-financed leisure – than do skilled workers. They 
may also have lower requirements for labour income, given fewer family responsibilities, 
which may reduce their dependence on, not only on the labour market in general, but also any 
particular  employer.  We  therefore  treat  it  as  an  empirical  issue,  whether  trainee  pay  is 
affected by monopsony power, and, if it is, whether it is more affected than is skilled pay. 
The results are potentially important, as the predictions of economic models of training may 
be sensitive to assumptions about pay-setting. In particular, the phenomenon of production-
oriented  training,  in  which  firms  provide  training  more  in  order  to  reduce  short-term 
production costs than to increase future skill supply, lies outside the explanatory scope of 
mainstream models of training, but it is potentially explicable in terms of what might be 
termed  wage  decompression,  based  on  greater  monopsony  power  over  trainee  than  over 
skilled labour (Wolter and Ryan 2010).
6  
A  further  potential  difficulty  in  mainstream  models  of  training ,  implicit  in  the  above 
discussion, is the assumption that trainees and  unskilled workers can be treated as  a single 
category, in terms of pay-setting. The assumption is consistent with the fact that any firm can 
in principle make its  unskilled employees into trainees and thus convert them into skilled 
workers. Informal on-the-job training given to existing adult employees at the workplace can 
plausibly be described in such terms. In particular, such training typically involves no 
reduction in pay for trainees during training (Ryan 1984; Barron, Berger and Black 1999). 
The same may not however be the case for  formalised long-term training for intermediate 
skills  –  a  category  that  includes,  in  both  Europe  and  North  America,  apprenticeship 
programmes, a type of training on which much of the evidence of employers‟ investment in 
general  skills  is  based.  In  such  programmes,  trainees  typically  differ  from  unskilled 
employees,  in  terms  of  educational  attainment,  age,  experience,  seniority  and  pay  in 
particular. Their lower pay is no surprise, as training costs are high and skills are certified and 
therefore presumptively general. But it may also be affected by differences in average age 
                                                           
6 Manning (2003b) predicts from the assumption of greater monopsony power over trainees than over skilled 
labour that firms will be unwilling to offer training, forcing workers to sponsor their own training apart from 
employment  ('education').  An  alternative  possibility  may  however  be  production-oriented  training,  and  the 
exploitation of trainees as production labour. 9 
 
and length of service (lower) and educational attainments (higher), and also by the extent to 
which  training  contracts  are  institutionally  distinct  from  regular  employment  contracts 
(Marsden and Ryan 1991; Ryan et al. 2010). For these reasons, pay setting for trainees may 
differ from that for unskilled workers, and with it the extent of monopsony power. 
3. Data 
Our data come from a recent (2004) administrative survey of the costs of apprenticeship 
training to Swiss employers.
7 The establishments involved are a random sample taken from 
the Establishment Register, operated by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, which contains 
all  non-agricultural  establishments in  the country.  After classifying  establishments as to 
whether they provide apprenticeship training or not   and sampling randomly within each 
category, our data comprise 2,413 training establishments, with a total of 13,454 apprentices, 
and (with a lower sampling frequency) 1,863 non-training firms.
8  
Our  evidence  for  trainees  concerns  work -based  training  for  skilled  occupations  in 
Switzerland.  The  training  is  organised  as  apprenticeship ,  combining  training  and  work 
experience at workplaces with part-time vocational education at public colleges. It resembles 
closely its German counterpart, a centre of interest in  recent economic analyses of training, 
not least in its clear distinction bet ween the status of trainee and employee.  Formally 
recognised apprenticeship training programmes, lasting between two and four years, operate 
in some 250 occupations, distributed across all sectors of the economy. More than three fifths 
of young people enter this type of training, typically after completion of lower secondary 
schooling (Hoeckel et al. 2009: 13; OPET 2009). The advantage of evidence for Switzerland 
lies in  the availability of data for both particular employers‟ training programmes and the 
local labour markets in which they operate. 
The survey collected information on the pay of skilled and unskilled employees, trainees, and 
on  such  attributes  of  the  establishment  as  its  size,  geographical  location,  sector  and  the 
                                                           
7 The series of surveys of the cost to employers of apprenticeship training in Germany in recent decades, which 
began with the Edding Commission (1974), is reviewed in Dionisius et al. (2009). The Swiss survey used 
broadly the same methodology as its German counterparts. 
8  Most establishments do not provide training: in 2005 only 17.8 per cent of all establishments provided 
apprenticeship in any occupation (FSO 2005), though the share rise s to around one -third if one -person 
businesses are excluded (Muehlemann et al. 2007: p. 144). The Swiss Federal Statistical Office used a sampling 
rate of 1.0 per cent for non-training establishments and 3.4 per cent for those that train. The data represent the 
entire national training system, excluding only a handful of agricultural apprentices. 10 
 
occupations  for  which  it  trains.  „Skilled‟  and  „unskilled‟  employees  are  distinguished 
according to whether they have completed an apprenticeship in the occupation in which they 
are  currently  employed.  The  „unskilled‟  category  therefore  includes  workers  without  any 
post-compulsory education.
9 
Pay is measured as the annual pre-tax basic pay of full-time employees and trainees, averaged 
across all  individuals  (apprentices or employees)  in  the  occupation in  the  establishment. 
Calculated from its monthly counterpart, it includes employee social security contributions, 
but excludes 13th and 14th month additional payments and any other non-regular payments, 
including performance bonuses.
10 
Summary statistics for pay and establishment attributes are reported in Table 1, for all firms 
and for training firms only; full definitions of the variables are given in the Appendix (Table 
A1). Skilled workers‟ pay exceeds unskilled pay by around 30 per cent on average. Unskilled 
pay is 4.5 times as high as trainees‟ pay, and skilled pay 6.5 times higher. The pay of skilled 
employees is 5.2 per cent higher in non-training than in training establishments. As unskilled 
pay differs little between the two categories, wage compression is greater in establishments 
with training than in those without it.  
The data also include establishment size, the amount of workplace-based training provided 









                                                           
9 Unskilled workers may however have some continuing or informal training but not enough for their skills to be 
certified, even though Switzerland has a system for certifying informally acquired skills. The unskilled category 
therefore comprises all workers whose skill levels are below those of certified skilled workers. 
10  An  alternative,  wider  definition  of  pay,  including  additional  payments  and  employers‟  social  security 
contributions and therefore close to total labour cost, was also considered. Base pay amounts on average to 81.3 
per cent of this measure of total labour cost (for skilled and unskilled employees combined). When pay is 
defined instead as total labour cost, the results of the regressions in section 6 change only slightly, and the index 
of monopsony power (number of firms per hectare) remains highly significant. 11 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std.dev.  Min  Max 
All firms (N=3592):         
Annual pay of skilled worker („000 CHF)  65.579  9.716  36.000  120.00 
Annual pay of unskilled worker in firm („000 CHF)  47.475  5.100  24.000  80.640 
Skilled worker / unskilled worker pay ratio   1.378  0.177  1.000  1.750 
Number of firms in area per hectare (sector)  0.035  0.038  0.001  0.145 
Number of firms in area per hectare (all sectors)  0.256  0.158  0.010  0.562 
Number of farms per hectare  0.023  0.008  0.002  0.043 
Firm size 1-9 employees  0.706  -  0  1 
Firm size 10-49 employees  0.234  -  0  1 
Firm size 50-99 employees  0.032  -  0  1 
Firm size 100+ employees  0.028  -  0  1 
Profitability  (1=very  good  /rather  good,  0=medium/ 
rather poor /very poor) 
0.361  -  0  1 
Technical  status  of  equipment  (1=very  good  /rather 
good, 0=medium/ rather poor /very poor) 
0.533  -  0  1 
Training firms (N=2243)         
Annual pay of skilled worker („000 CHF)  63.352  10.834  36.000  120.000 
Annual pay of unskilled worker in firm („000 CHF)  47.796  54.518  24.000  80.640 
Annual average apprentice pay (‟000 CHF)  10.313  24.402  3.647  24.675 
Skilled worker / unskilled worker pay ratio   1.322  0.188  1.000  1.750 
Apprentice / unskilled worker pay ratio  0.218  0.056  0.092  0.513 
Skilled worker / apprentice pay ratio  6.422  1.654  2.301  15.668 
Number of firms in area per hectare (own sector)  0.031  0.034  0.001  0.145 
Number of firms in area per hectare (other sectors)  0.213  0.135  0.001  0.562 
Number of firms in area per hectare (all sectors)  0.244  0.153  0.010  0.562 
Number of farms per hectare  0.023  0.008  0.002  0.043 
Firm size 1-9 employees  0.557  -  0  1 
Firm size 10-49 employees  0.321  -  0  1 
Firm size 50-99 employees  0.053  -  0  1 
Firm size 100+ employees  0.068  -  0  1 
Hours of formal training per apprentice/week  6.022  3.337  0.500  20.000 
Profitability  (1=very  good  /rather  good,  0=medium/ 
rather poor /very poor) 
0.382  0.486  0  1 
Technical  status  of  equipment  (1=very  good  /rather 
good, 0=medium/ rather poor /very poor) 
0.549  0.498  0  1 
  Source: 2004 Survey. 12 
 
We  enlarge  the  survey  data  with  locational  information,  concerning  the  commune  (i.e., 
municipality, local authority) in which the establishment is situated, taken from the Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office. The key variable is the number of (non-agricultural) establishments 
within the establishment‟s local labour market, differentiated by two-digit sectors, taken from 
the  Swiss  establishment  register,  which  is  administered  by  the  Swiss  Federal  Statistical 
Office. We take from the census of establishments in agriculture the number of farms in the 
locality, as a measure of the degree of rurality of the local labour market. 
We take local labour markets to be based on particular towns, and include all establishments 
that can be reached from the town centre within 30 minutes by car under normal traffic 
conditions.
11  This criterion is  preferable  to the two alternative  criteria  that dominate the 
empirical literature on monopsony: the administrative district (e.g., town and city boundaries) 
and travel distance (e.g., a 30 kilometre radius from the town centre).
12 We define the 67 
largest Swiss towns and cities as each constituting the centre  of a local labour market, and 
classify all establishments as belonging to one, and only one, of those markets.
13  If the 
establishment is situated in a town that is not large enough to  be treated as the  centre of a 
labour market, it is classified as belonging to the closest one. 
Taking  monopsony power  as arising from  buyer concentration in  the labour market, we 
measure it as the number of establishments in an establishment‟s local labour market divided 
by  the  area  covered  by  the  market:  i.e.,  number  of  establishments  per  hectare.
14  Other 
scholars have used a  two-dimensional  conception of monopsony  power in local labour 
                                                           
11 In our data, travel time to particular establishments was measured with the software Microsoft Autoroute 
2005. The 30 minute criterion is chosen in the light of actual travel to work times: in 2000, 84 per cent of Swiss 
employees spent no more than 30 minutes travelling to and from work (one way trip; FSO 2000). Duranton and 
Overman (2005) find for the UK that the localization of employment takes place mostly within 50km, which 
broadly corresponds to a travel time of 30 minutes. Similarly, Manning (2003a) reports for Britain that more 
than 80 per cent of travel-to-work times last no more than 30 minutes.  
12 Commuting cost is in principle a function of both time (foregone earnings or leisure) and distance (fares, 
gasoline, etc.), with a positive correlation between time and distance. The correlation is however limited and in 
some cases (e.g. when both home and job are located beside a freeway or railway line) a long distance does not 
necessarily imply long time of travel. We implicitly treat the costs of t ime as more important than the costs of 
distance in cases of divergence. 
13 In densely populated areas, such as the region around Zurich, travel-to-work districts overlap, in the sense that 
an establishment located at or near the intersection between two di stricts can potentially recruit workers from 
either district.  
14 An alternative to the number of employers is total employment in the local market. Neither measure is ideal, 
and in the case of literal monopsony (a „company town‟), total employment would be distinctly inferior to 
number  of  employers  as  a  measure.  Data  for  the  ideal  measure  (number  of  vacancies)  are  not  available, 
however, and in any case the two measures are highly correlated and generate broadly similar statistical results, 
but with slightly weaker associations when total employment is used. 13 
 
markets:  the  size  of  the  market  and  the  (absolute)  number  of  employers  (in  the  same 
occupation and sector; Hirsch and Schumacher 1995). Our use of travel-to-work areas rather 
than local government administrative ones allows us to compress these two dimensions into 
one by standardising the number of employers for the geographical size of the market.  
We allow for potential sector-specificity in competition for labour by distinguishing between 
establishments in the same (two-digit) sector and those in other sectors. To the extent that 
skilled occupations are sector-specific, competition for skilled labour is expected to count 
only within the sector of the establishment in question. Thus, in Silicon Valley, competition 
may be expected to be fierce for IT software engineers, but not for pipeline welders, and this 
favours the use of the in-sector rather than the all-sector measure of fewness of firms. By 
contrast,  for  accountants,  an  occupation  present  in  all  sectors,  the  all-sector  measure  is 
expected  to  be  superior.  As  systematic  data  on  the  sector-specificity  of  skills  across 
occupations are not available, we measure buyer concentration on both the in-sector and the 
all-sector bases and compare the results attained on each basis.
15 
Table A2  in the Appendix  provides summary statistics  for the number of  establishments 
within  individual  local labour markets  by  two-digit  sector.  For example (first row), the 
number of establishments within mining and quarrying averages nearly 20 across the 63 local 
labour markets, and ranges from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 50.  Across all sectors 
(penultimate row), the average is  416 establishments within the individual sector and local 
labour market; the minimum number averages ten, the maximum number 1685. These data 
suggest that competition for labour  –  that  is,  setting  aside  labour  market  frictions  –  is 
potentially substantial overall, and highly variable across localities, both within particular 
sectors and across sectors as a whole.  
Finally, we need to control statistically for other local attributes that not only potentially 
influence pay but also do so in association with fewness of employers. The notable factor is 
rurality: living costs, and with them pay, are expected to be lower in the countryside and in 
country  towns  than  in  large  towns  and  cities.  We  therefore  include  a  measure  of  the 
importance  of  farming  in  the  local  labour  market,  in  terms  of  the  number  of  farms  per 
hectare. 
                                                           
15 A two-way classification of employment by occupation and sector would be required to judge the extent of 
sector specificity in skills, but no such data are available for Switzerland.  14 
 
4. Estimation and results 
This section discusses the issues that arise in estimating monopsony effects on pay from 
cross-sectional  data  on  establishments  and  local  labour  markets.  It  then  presents  the 
estimates,  distinguishing  between  results  for  all  establishments  and  for  those  that  offer 
training. 
4.1 Empirical strategy 
Our empirical approach contains two components: first, an analysis of standardised absolute 
levels of pay within particular occupations; second, an analysis of occupational differentials 
in pay between skilled employees, unskilled employees, and trainees. The latter results are of 
particular interest for two reasons: first, they implicitly control for the various firm-specific 
and  location-specific  factors  that  have  been  seen  as  distorting  those  previous  studies  of 
monopsony  power  that  exploit  variation  across  local  labour  markets;  second,  they  bear 
directly on the economics of training, as noted in section 2 above.  
In more detail, our first dependent variable is average pay in occupation k in establishment i, 
relative to mean for pay in that occupation in the country as a whole:  
 
   
    
                                    (1) 
where       is  average  pay  in  occupational  group  k  (skilled,  unskilled
16,  trainee)  in 
establishment i, and    k is average worker pay across establishments in the same occupational 
group (at national level); Mki
 is our indicator of monopsony power (number of establishments 
per  hectare  in  the  same  local  labour  market  as  establishment  i,  distinguishing  between 
establishments  in  the  same  sector  and  in  other  sectors)
17;  Xi,  a  vector  of  establishment 
attributes  (size,  technical  status  and  profitability).  Controls  for  occupation  and  sector  are 
                                                           
16 We standardise unskilled pay as the ratio of unskilled pay observed in establishment  i employing skilled 
workers in occupational group k, divided by average pay of unskilled workers in all establishments in the whole 
country employing skilled workers in occupational group k. (When we standardise instead by unskilled pay in 
the whole country, our empirical results with respect to monopsony power remained qualitatively unaffected.)  
17  Swiss  Census  data  do  not  permit  us  to  identify  (as  an  establishment‟s  local  competitors)  only  other 
establishments  that  have  employees  in  the  skilled  occupation  by  which  the  establishment  in  question  is 
represented in the survey. We therefore take its competitors to be all local establishments that operate in the 
same sector (product market). The closer the fit between principal occupation and sector across establishments, 
the  less  is  this  discrepancy.  Some  occupations  are  highly  sector-specific,  such  as  retailing  salesperson  (to 
retailing); others less so, such as administrator (Kaufmann/frau) to banking. 15 
 
included.
 The occupational categories (k) for the skilled worker and trainee groups comprise 
the 23 most important occupations in Switzerland, which accounted for roughly 70 per cent 
of  all  apprenticeship  contracts  in  2004  (and  thus  cover  the  largest  categories  of  skilled 
occupations by employment, see Potterat 2006).
18 
Thus, the advantage of our empir ical approach is that w e analyse average pay in a single 
occupational category in an establishment, rather than the average pay of skilled workers  in 
all occupations in that establishment, in order to reduce any uncontrolled occupation-specific 
effects on pay. 
Our second dependent variable is relative pay, i.e., the ratio of mean pay in one occupational 
group (skilled, unskilled, trainee) relative to that in another group:  
   
   
                                 (2) 
where       is  average  pay  in  occupation  group  k,  and       in  occupation  group  j,  in 
establishment i. When the two groups are skilled employees and unskilled employees, this 
formulation tests for wage compression associated with monopsony power (     ). 
We control for different establishment characteristics, represented by the vector   . Pay may 
be expected to vary with such employer characteristics as establishment size, technology, and 
profitability. To some extent this is predicated on monopsony power: in particular, given an 
upward sloping supply curve, larger establishments have to offer higher pay to maintain their 
higher level of employment. But even in the absence of monopsony power, companies that 
are more technologically advanced, productive and profitable are expected to pay more, as 
part of widespread rent-sharing in labour markets (Manning 2010). We therefore include both 
establishment  size  and  a  combined  indicator  of  the  technological  sophistication  and 
profitability of the establishment.
19 Finally, from the human capital standpoint, firms that 
                                                           
18  The  remaining  occupational  categories  are  grouped  by  the  length  of  the  training  required  to  obtain  the 
professional qualification (two, three and four years). 
19  The survey provides only qualitative, self -assessment measures of  technological level and profitability, 
summarised in Table 1 above. Owing to a high (positive) correlation between the two measures, we combine 
them into a single indicator that takes on the value 1 if either the technological level or profitability have  a 
reported value of “very good” or “rather good”, and the value 0 otherwise. 16 
 
provide more training are expected to offer lower pay to trainees. We therefore control at 
establishment level for the amount of training provided per trainee. 
Weakness or absence of controls for other pay-relevant attributes of localities have impaired 
much of the empirical literature on monopsony power in local markets (Boal and Ransom 
1997). The major prospective concern is living costs: the prices of housing, food, fuel, etc. 
vary considerably across localities, and are expected to cause pay to vary too. As it is normal 
for local labour markets in rural areas to have both few employers and low living costs, 
controls  for  living  costs  are  necessary  to  avoid  biased  estimates  of  monopsony  effects. 
Lacking measures of living costs by locality, we address the problem in three ways. First, we 
control  statistically  for  rurality  by  including  number  of  farms  (per  hectare)  in  the 
regressions.
20 Second, we  use within-establishment pay differentials to control for  locality 
effects.  If  differences  in  living  costs  across  districts  are  assumed  to  have  the  same 
proportionate effect on the pay of skilled workers,  unskilled workers, and trainees alike, any 
association between relative pay and fewness of firms can be inter preted as evidence of 
monopsony  power.  Third,  while we  analyse  the  effect  on  pay  of  the  total  number  of 
establishments within a local labo ur market, we also analyse the effect  of the  number of 
establishments within the  establishment‟s own sector. Thus, our empirical measure allows 
monopsony power to exist in any local labour market, not just in localities with low levels of 
economic activity. 
Lacking  employer-employee  matched  data,  we  cannot  control  directly  for  differences 
between establishments and localities in employee attributes, notably schooling and ability. 
Insofar  as  those  attributes  are  associated  with  fewness  of  employers,  our  estimates  of 
monopsony effects on pay become biased. Although number of employers and labour quality 
may not be associated across establishments within a sector, low pay may reflect low labour 
quality  rather  than  monopsony  power,  and  rural  labour  markets  may  have  both  fewer 
employers and lower labour quality.  
Some reassurance is provided by two considerations. First, to the extent that establishments 
with higher pay employ proportionally higher labour quality in all occupations, our results for 
relative  pay  are  unaffected  by  the  lack  of  explicit  controls  for  labour  quality.  Second,  a 
                                                           
20 We also used in the regressions alternative measures of rurality: number of cows per hectare or farmland per 
hectare. The three variables are highly inter-correlated and the results are not sensitive to which is chosen as 
control variable. 17 
 
minimum  educational  attainment  is  present:  first,  all  skilled  employees  possess  a  federal 
apprenticeship certificate in upper secondary education
21; second, trainees are required by 
law to have obtained a certificate in lower secondary education before entering training. 
Finally, as in all cross-sectional analysis, concerns arise about endogeneity. Can differences 
in pay across establishments be taken as exogenous, or may they be jointly determined with 
employment?  A  possible  source  of  endogeneity  might  be  the  locational  decisions  of 
employers and workers: to the extent that firms move to low wage labour markets and 
workers to high wage ones, pay and employment are jointly determined. In particular, local 
labour markets with low pay can attract in-migration by employers, reducing the monopsony 
power of the existing employers. Such tendencies are however expected to be weak,  given 
that  firms  typically  face  mobility  costs   too,  based  e.g.,  on:  distance  from  customers ; 





We first test for monopsony power in  the pay  of skilled and unskilled employees in the 
sample of all establishments. The second step is to test for it for trainees as well, which 
means  restricting  the  sample  to  establishments  that  provide  apprenticeship  training.  We 
present  results  for  both  absolute  pay  and  relative  pay;  in  all  equations  are  estimated  by 
ordinary least squares, using cluster-robust standard errors. 
All establishments 
Starting with the full sample, we test for monopsony power in absolute pay using equation (1) 
above. The standardised absolute pay of skilled workers proves positively and significantly 
associated,  as  predicted,  with  the  number  of  employers  in  the  local  labour  market.  The 
coefficient of 0.114 in column 1 of Table 2 means that a one standard-deviation increase in 
                                                           
21  The  Eidgenössisches  Fähigkeitszeugnis  (EFZ)  is  a  certified  federal  professional  qualification  at  upper 
secondary education level (OPET 2009). 
22 Instrumental variables regression would in principle address directly the issue of endogeneity. To be valid, an 
instrument would have to be associated with the number of competitors in the locality without itself having any 
any direct impact on pay levels or differentials. Our data do not however contain information that could be used 
as an instrument. 18 
 
the  number  of  establishments  in  the  local  labour  market  is  associated  with  an  estimated 
increase in the pay of skilled workers in the establishment of 1.8 per cent. The same does not 
however apply to unskilled employees: changes in the number of local establishments are not 
significantly associated with their pay (column 3). 
When the number of local establishments is divided into those in the same sector and those in 
other sectors, skilled pay proves positively associated with both (column 2). A one standard-
deviation increase in the number of establishments in the same sector is associated with an 
increase in relative pay of 1.1 per cent; in other sectors, by the same amount. Neither variable 
is significant for unskilled employees (column 4). 
These results align with the standard assumption of many economic analyses that pay is set 
by monopsony power for skilled workers and by perfect competition for unskilled ones. They 
are  however  potentially  impaired  by  the  difficulty  of  controlling  for  fixed  effects  by 
establishment and locality. The difficulty is in principle removed when pay is analysed in 
relative terms – i.e., using differences in skilled and unskilled pay within an establishment to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity in the establishment and the locality. 
The  pay  of  an  establishment‟s  skilled  employees  remains  positively  associated  with  the 
number of local establishments when expressed in relative terms, using unskilled pay as the 
base. A one standard-deviation increase in the number of firms is associated with an increase 
in  the  skilled-unskilled  pay  differential  of  1.6  per  cent  (column  5).  When  the  sectoral 
affiliation of establishments is considered, a one standard-deviation increase in the number of 
establishments is associated with increases of 1.0 and 0.6 per cent in the relative pay of 
skilled employees, for „same sector‟ and „other sector‟ variants, respectively (column 6). This 
pattern suggests that competition for skilled labour has a somewhat stronger effect on relative 
pay  when  it occurs within  a sector than  across sectors, but  that  – consistent with  cross-
sectoral  employment  in  some  skilled  occupations  –  competition  across  sectors  is  also 
influential. 
Concerning  other  influences  on  pay,  we  find  the  standard  positive  relationship  between 
establishment  size  and  pay  that  is  the  predicted  consequence  of  rising  supply  price, 
presumptively  caused  by  monopsony  power.  The  relative  pay  of  skilled  workers  in 
establishments with 100 or more employees is eight per cent higher than that in those with 19 
 
less than ten employees. The size effect on pay is also significantly positive for unskilled 
workers, but somewhat weaker than for skilled ones.  
The possibility that competition for labour has different effects on pay according to the size 
of establishment – e.g., affecting pay less strongly in large than in small plants – is examined 
by interacting establishment size and number of establishments.
23 No significant interactions 
emerge. 
Rurality, a proxy for local attributes potentially related to living costs,  also matters:  the 
number of farms in the local labour market – interpreted as an inverse proxy for living costs – 
is negatively and significantly associated with pay in all equations. A one standard-deviation 
increase in the number of farms is associated with a reduction of 1.2 per cent in skilled pay, 
one of 0.5 per cent in unskilled pay, and one of between 0.6 and 0.8 per cent in the skilled-
unskilled  pay  differential,  depending  on  whether  the  sectoral  affiliation  of  local 
establishments is distinguished or not. 
Our measure of the condition of the establishment, based on managers‟ reports of equipment 
quality and profitability, is positively associated with pay for skilled employees, but not for 
unskilled ones. Firms that use more modern technology or are more profitable have around 
two per cent higher pay for skilled workers but no pay premium for  unskilled ones. All 
regressions involve controls for unobserved fixed effects by sector.  
Training establishments 
We noted in section 2 above that pay setting for trainees may differ from that for skilled and 
unskilled workers, and that employers may possess market power over trainees, particularly 
apprentices, even when they do not over unskilled workers. 
We  therefore  widen  the  scope  to  include  pay  determination  for  trainees,  which  means 
restricting the sample to establishments that offer apprenticeship training. We first re-estimate 
the absolute pay and the relative pay equations (1 and 2, above, respectively) for training 
firms only, using the equivalent equations for trainees. We also control for the amount of 
training provided by including a measure of average training time provided per trainee, as 
                                                           
23 Large establishments might enjoy more monopsony power than small ones, for a give number of competitors 
– so that, where one very large plant competes with many very small ones, number of establishments might not 
capture well the monopsony power of the large establishment. 20 
 
measured by the weekly hours that skilled workers are removed from productive work on 
average in order to provide training.  
The results show that the number of local establishments is associated with the absolute level 
of pay across training establishments, as for all establishments. A one standard-deviation 
increase in the number of local establishments is associated with an increase of 1.5 per cent in 
skilled pay among training firms, as compared to 1.8 per cent in the full sample (Table 3, col. 
1).
24 When local competitors for labour are distinguished according to „own sector‟ or „other 
sector‟  status,  the  coefficients  on  both  variables  are  correctly  signed,  but  neither  is 
statistically significant (p=.05; loc cit., column 2).
25 Nor does any significant effect emerge 
for the number of establishments, however the variable is defined, in the case of  unskilled 
pay. The results for the control variables, notably the degree of rurality, are similar to those 
for  the  „all  establishments‟  sample,  except  that  the  technology-profitability  index  is  now 
insignificant. 
Including  trainees,  as  distinct  from  unskilled  employees,  we  find  monopsony  effects  on 
absolute pay. A one standard-deviation increase in the number of local establishments is 
associated with an increase of trainee pay of 1.9 per cent (Table 3, col. 5). When the sectoral 
affiliation of establishments is brought in, the effect is found to involve the „same sector‟ 
measure, a one standard-deviation increase in which is associated with an increase in trainee 
pay  of  3.3  per  cent.  The  number  of  establishments  in  other  sectors,  by  contrast,  has  no 
significant association with trainee pay. 
                                                           
24 As economic theories of training predict that training firms have more monopsony power than non-training 
ones, the difference between the coefficients might be viewed as anomalous. Our result – quite apart from its 
small size, statistically speaking – bears however on a different issue: whether an increase in monopsony power 
has more effect on pay among training firms than among other ones. 
25 The coefficient on the „other sectors‟ variable is significant at p=.10. Statistical insignificance in the training 
establishments sub-sample, in contrast to the results for all establishments, is associated with higher standard 
errors.   21 
Table 2: Regression results: skilled pay, unskilled pay and pay differentials 
 
  Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; n = 3562 
   Skilled pay  Less skilled pay  Skilled/unskilled pay 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Number of establishments in locality per hectare (all sectors)  0.114      0.015     0.104   
(0.023)    (0.015)    (0.019)     
Number of establishments in locality per hectare (own sector)    0.302    -0.014    0.368 
    (0.153)    (0.060)    (0.134) 
Number of establishments in locality per hectare (other sectors)     0.082    0.021    0.062 
    (0.038)    (0.022)    (0.028) 
Number of farms per hectare  -1.337  -1.311  -0.580  -0.584  -0.812  -0.775 
  (0.414)  (0.423)  (0.292)  (0.292)  (0.350)  (0.353) 
Establishment size 10-49 employees  0.066  0.066  0.053  0.053  0.017  0.018 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Establishment size 50-99 employees  0.086  0.084  0.036  0.037  0.060  0.059 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Establishment size 100+ employees  0.084  0.085  0.033  0.035  0.084  0.085 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Technical status of equipment / profitability 
 
0.020  0.020  0.001  0.001  0.019  0.019 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Sector controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Occupation controls  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Constant  0.991  0.993  1.035  1.035  1.294  1.294 
   (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
R
2  0.105  0.105  0.449  0.449  0.342  0.343   22 
This  evidence  of  monopsony  power  in  apprentice  pay  setting  is  inconsistent  with  the 
assumptions of contemporary models of training, which for the most part treat trainees and 
„unskilled‟ workers as identical and assume competitive pay setting for both. Also striking is 
the  evidence  that  non-competitive  effects  on  trainee  pay  involve  the  number  of 
establishments in the same sector (i.e., ex post, the sector in which training is occurring), not 
the number in other sectors: trainees might be expected to lack sector affiliation before they 
start training. If so, competition should therefore be measured, and matter statistically, on an 
„all sector‟ basis rather than an „own sector‟ one. The result may be interpreted as evidence 
that  potential  trainees  develop  affiliations  (preferences),  by  sector  and  implicitly  by 
occupation (e.g. hairdressing), before they start training, combined with a high success rate 
for  would-be  trainees  in  terms  of  finding  a  training  place  in  their  preferred  sector  and 
occupation.
26 Our result suggests that offers of training by employers in sectors other than the 
desired one are not valued highly, even when well paid. 
We  now  analyse  pay  differentials  between  the  three  occupational  categories  (skilled, 
unskilled,  and  trainees),  as  representing  the  specification  for  which  uncontrolled 
establishment and locality effects may be expected to be weak. We consider first the pay 
differential between skilled and unskilled workers. The number of establishments in the local 
labour market again proves positively and significantly associated with pay structure. A one-
standard deviation increase in the number of establishments (all sectors) is associated with an 
increase in the skilled-unskilled pay differential of 1.6 per cent (Table 4, col. 1)  – a finding 
that similar to that for all firms (Table 2, col. 5). 
Separation of number of establishments according to „own‟ and „other‟ status produces, as for 
absolute skilled pay, positive coefficients, but no significant association with either variable 
(Table 4, col. 2).
27  
                                                           
26 There is empirical evidence in favour of this hypothesis, as 70 per cent of Swiss apprentices report that they 
get their first choice of training occupation (SKBF, 2010). 
27 The number of firms becomes insignificant when the sample is restricted to training firms partly because of 
the increase in standard errors, which may in turn reflect a reduction in identifying variation caused by non -
randomness in the selection of firms  according to training status: training firms are expected to have more 
monopsony power on average. 23 
 
Table 3: Skilled, unskilled and trainee pay, training establishments only 
 
  Skilled pay  Less skilled pay  Trainee pay 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Number of establishments in locality  
(all sectors) 
0.098 
(0.030)    0.022 
(0.137)    0.127 
(0.033)   
Number of establishments in locality  
(own sector) 
  0.200 
(0.260)    0.016 
(0.010)    0.959 
(0.190) 
Number of establishments in locality  
(other sectors)  
  0.083 
(0.049)    0.023 
(0.018)    0.008 
(0.047) 
Number of farms per hectare  -0.971  -0.961  -0.693  -0.692  -2.318  -2.217 
  (0.512)  (0.515)  (0.276)  (0.275)  (0.584)  (0.598) 
Establishment size 10-49 employees  0.064  0.064  0.043  0.043  0.047  0.047 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Establishment size 50-99 employees  0.079  0.079  0.023  0.023  0.041  0.039 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Establishment size 100+ employees  0.089  0.089  0.024  0.024  0.084  0.084 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Technical status of equipment / profitability  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Hours of weekly training time x 10
-1          -0.026  -0.025 
          (0.014)  (0.014) 
Sector controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  1.001  1.002  1.019  1.019  1.034  1.040 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
R
2  0.101  0.101  0.240  0.240  0.089  0.097 
Notes: N= 2243; Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The number of farms, our measure of the rurality of localities, does not have a significant 
association with relative pay among training establishments – a result consistent with the 
similarity of its association with absolute pay in both employee categories (Table 3).  
Similarly, the indicator used for technology and profitability is not significantly associated 
with relative pay. 
By contrast, plant size is positively related to the skilled-unskilled wage differential, which is 
about 10 per cent higher in firms with 100 or more employees compared to firms with less 
than 10 employees. The significance of plant size is consistent with its greater importance for 
the absolute pay of skilled than for that of unskilled workers (Table 2, above).  24 
 
 
Table 4: Within-establishment pay differentials in training firms 
 
  Skilled / unskilled  Trainee / unskilled  Skilled / trainee 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Number of establishments in locality  0.100    0.020    -0.265   
(all sectors)  (0.031)    (0.007)    (0.233)   
Number of establishments in locality     0.240    0.221    -5.706 
(own sector)    (0.241)    (0.045)    (2.041) 
Number of establishments in locality     0.080    -0.009    0.504 
(other sectors)    (0.055)    (0.011)    (0.365) 
Number of farms per hectare  -0.381  -0.363  -0.354  -0.330  5.744  5.142 
  (0.499)  (0.507)  (0.127)  (0.129)  (3.575)  (3.731) 
Establishment size 10-49 employees  0.034  0.034  0.002  0.002  0.105  0.105 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.103)  (0.102) 
Establishment size 50-99 employees  0.073  0.073  0.003  0.003  0.172  0.183 
  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.123)  (0.121) 
Establishment size 100+ employees  0.100  0.100  0.011  0.011  0.107  0.108 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.114)  (0.114) 
Technical status of equipment / profitability  0.005  0.005  0.002  0.001  0.027  0.019 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.087)  (0.086) 
Hours of weekly training time (x 10
-1)      -0.010  -0.010  0.174  0.167 
      (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.147)  (0.146) 
Sector controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Occupation controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  1.190  1.190  0.190  0.190  6.393  6.393 
  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.311)  (0.313) 
R
2  0.192  0.193  0.472  0.477  0.331  0.335 
Observations  2243  2243  2243  2243  2243  2243 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Turning to the pay differential between trainees and unskilled employees, we find a positive 
association with number of establishments (all sectors). A one standard-deviation increase in 
the number of establishments is associated with a 1.4 per cent increase in the relative pay of 
trainees (Table 4, col. 3). This suggests that reductions in competition in a locality depress 
trainee pay proportionately more strongly than they do skilled pay. 
Breaking down competition by the two sector categories suggests – as for absolute trainee 
pay (Table 3) – that it is competition in the same sector, not other sectors, that matters. A one 
standard-deviation increase in the number of establishments in the same sectors is associated 
with an increase in trainees‟ relative pay of 4.4 per cent (Table 4, col. 4), whereas an increase 25 
 
in the number in the same sector is not associated with any significant difference in relative 
pay.  
Rurality, viz. the number of farms in the local labour market, has a significant association 
with  trainees‟  relative  pay:  a  one-standard  deviation  increase  in  the  number  of  farms  is 
associated with a decrease in relative pay of 1.4 per cent (Table 4, cols 3, 4). This reflects the 
stronger negative association of absolute pay with rurality for trainees  than for  unskilled 
employees.
28 In addition, the relative pay of trainees and unskilled workers in establishments 
with more than 100 employees is about 6 per cent (or 0.12 percentage points) higher  than in 
firms with less than 10 employees. 
The number of weekly training hours  provided by the employer has a significantly negative 
association with  relative pay, consistent with the predictions of human capital theory,  and 
reflecting lower absolute pay for trainees in establishments that provide more training. A one-
standard deviation increase in weekly training hours decreases trainee relative pay by 1.6 per 
cent. 
Finally, having tested  for monopsony power  over  skilled  employees  and trainees, using 
unskilled employees as an implicit control group, the question arises: is  monopsony power 
greater over skilled workers than over trainees ? Influential models of training assume  that 
this is the case, and  that it  generates „wage compression‟. The issue is however  a priori 
ambiguous:  some  factors  point  to  greater  monopsony  power  for  trainees  than  for  skilled 
workers, others to less (section 2.2).  
Our data exceptionally permit us to test for monopsony power in terms of the pay differential 
between skilled workers and trainees within occupations. The skilled-trainee pay differential 
is not associated with number of local establishments when the latter is measured on an „all 
sector‟ basis, but it is when establishments in the same sector (only) are considered (Table 4, 
cols. 5, 6). A one-standard deviation increase in the number of establishments in the same 
sector is associated with a 3.4 per cent decrease in the pay of skilled workers relative to that 
of trainees (col. 6). As noted above, the pattern may be explicable in terms of cross-sector 
competition  for  skilled  labour  in  particular  occupations,  combined  with  strong  ex  ante 
                                                           
28 A result not shown in Table 4 is that the coefficient on number of establishment is affected only marginally by 
the removal of the rurality variable. 26 
 
preferences for sectors and occupations among potential trainees. It suggests that monopsony 
power is associated with wage decompression, not wage compression, when trainees replace 
unskilled employees as the numeraire. 
The extent of wage compression is  however  not  significantly associated with  any of the 
control  variables  –  rurality,  establishment  size,  technology/profitability,  nor  with  training 
intensity – apart, that is, from fixed effects by sector and occupation. 
In sum, the results suggest that monopsony power, at least in the spatial dimension that our 
data  capture,  is  indeed  associated  with  wage  compression  between  skilled  and  unskilled 
employees, as is widely assumed in the economics of training. The evidence also suggests, by 
contrast,  that  monopsony  power  leads,  under  these  circumstances  at  least,  to  wage 
decompression between skilled employees and trainees. This result, which does not  align 
with the assumptions of standard economic models of training, points to the need, first, to 
distinguish  between  trainees  and  unskilled  workers,  and,  second,  to  consider  production-




Using a direct measure of the „thinness‟ of local labour markets, we test for the presence of 
monopsony  power  in  markets  for  skilled  labour,  unskilled  labour,  and  trainees  in  the 
contemporary  Swiss  labour  market.  We  control  for  establishment-specific  and  locality-
specific determinants of pay by focusing on pay differentials between skilled workers and 
unskilled employees, on the one side, and trainees in the same establishment, on the other.  
The results suggest that firms possess market power over skilled workers, and that differences 
in  that  power  are  associated  with  differences  in  pay.  The  within-establishment  pay 
differential between skilled and unskilled labour increases with the number of competitors in 
the local labour market. The finding contrasts to some earlier studies that found no effect for 
employer concentration on pay when controls are imposed for other locality-specific factors.
 
A key difference from earlier studies is our definition of local labour markets, as dependent 
on travel-to-work time rather than political borders or travel distance, which provides us with 27 
 
a superior measure of the commuting costs that underlie monopsony power, as captured here. 
Our evidence also covers a wider range of skilled occupations than in the previous literature, 
which focused primarily on single occupations, such as nurse or school-teacher. 
The pay effects we estimate are moderately large. A two standard-deviation increase in both 
directions in the local number of establishments in the same two-digit sector, which embraces 
the vast majority of cases, is associated, in the results for all establishments, with an increase 
in the relative pay of skilled to unskilled labour of 4.0 per cent; the same increase in the 
number of establishments in other sectors, with an additional 2.4 per cent. These magnitudes 
are consistent with the view of monopsony power as „widespread but small on average‟ (Boal 
and Ransom 1997: 110). At the same time, our evidence captures only differences across 
establishments and only one source of monopsony power. More comprehensive measures, 
were they available, could be expected to show bigger effects on pay. 
Our  finding  of  monopsony  power  for  employers  in  the  Swiss  labour  market  opens  new 
perspectives on the economics of work-based training. We conclude that more monopsony 
power  is  associated  with  lower  absolute  pay  for  skilled  workers,  but  not  for  unskilled 
workers. These results not only align well with the assumptions of mainstream models of 
training, they provide unusually direct evidence in support thereof. In addition, however, we 
find that firms have significant monopsony power over trainees, and that the effect on pay is 
proportionately  stronger  for  trainees  than  for  skilled  workers:  a  one  standard-deviation 
increase in the number of local employers in the same sector reduces the ratio of skilled pay 
to  trainee  pay  by  3.4  percent.  Monopsony  is  associated  with  wage  decompression,  not 
compression, in this dimension of training-related pay structure. 
The  stronger  effect  of  monopsony  power  on  pay  for  trainees  than  for  skilled  workers 
indicates that the „action‟ when it comes to its stimulative effect on training involves trainees 
as least as much as skilled workers. This suggests that economic models of training should be 
extended to allow for greater monopsony power over trainees than over skilled workers. The 
result may be an incentive to employers to supply higher levels of training than predicted by 
some models of training under wage compression. The anticipated results are both a firmer 
analytical basis for the economics of production-oriented training, and the prospect of an 
economic theory of training that has greater generality than those that currently dominate the 




Acemoglu,  D.  and  J.-S.  Pischke  (1998),  „Why  do  firms  train?  Theory  and  evidence‟,  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 63(1), 79-110. 
Acemoglu, D. and J.-S. Pischke (1999a), „Beyond Becker: training in imperfect labour markets‟, 
Economic Journal, 109, F112-42. 
Acemoglu, D. and J.-S. Pischke (1999b), „The structure of wages and investment in general training‟, 
Journal of Political Economy, 107(3), 539-72. 
Ashenfelter,  O.,  H.  Farber  and  M.R.  Ransom  (2010),  „Modern  models  of  monopsony  in  labor 
markets: A Brief Survey‟, Journal of Labor Economics 28(2), 203-210. 
Barron, J.M., M.C. Berger and D.A. Black (1999), „Do workers pay for on-the-job training?‟, Journal 
of Human Resources, 34(2), 235-52.  
Becker, G. (1964), Human Capital. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Bhaskar, V., and T. To (1999), „Minimum wages for Ronald McDonald monopsonies: a theory of 
monopsonistic competition‟, The Economic Journal 109 (April), 190-203. 
Bhaskar, V., A. Manning and T. To (2002), „Oligopsony and monopsonistic competition in labor 
markets?‟, Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(2), 155-174. 
Becker, G.S. (1964), Human Capital. New York: NBER. 
Beicht, U., G. Walden and H. Herget (2004), Kosten und Nutzen der betrieblichen Berufsausbildung 
in  Deutschland.  Bundesinstitut  für  Berufsbildung.  Berichte  zur  beruflichen  Bildung. 
Bertelsmann: Bielefeld 
Boal,  W.M.  and  M.R.  Ransom  (1997), „Monopsony  in  the  labour  market‟,  Journal of  Economic 
Literature, March; 35(1), 86-112. 
Brueckner, J.K., J.-F. Thisse and Y. Zenou (2002), „Local labor markets, job matching and urban 
location‟, International Economic Review 43, 91-107. 
Bunting, R. L. (1962), „Employee concentration in local labour markets‟, Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press. 
Burdett, K. and Mortensen, D.T. (1998), „Wage differentials, employer size, and unemployment‟. 
International Economic Review 39(2), 257-273. 
Chang,  C.  and  Y.  Wang  (1996),  „Human  capital  investment  under  asymmetric  information:  the 
Pigovian conjecture revisited‟, Journal of Labour Economics, 4(3), 505-19. 
Devereux, M. P., R. Griffith and H. Simpson (2007), „Firm location decisions, regional grants and 
agglomeration externalities‟. Journal of Public Economics, 91(3-4): 413-435.  
Dionisius, R., S. Muehlemann, H. Pfeifer, G. Walden, F. Wenzelmann and S.C. Wolter (2009), „Costs 
and benefits of apprenticeship training: a comparison of Germany and Switzerland‟, Applied 
Economics Quarterly, 55(1), 7-37. 
Duranton,  G.  and  Overman,  H.G.  (2005),  „Testing  for  localization  using  micro-geographic  data‟, 
Review of Economic Studies, 72: 1077–1106  
Dustmann,  C.  and  U.  Schönberg  (2009),  „Training  and  union  wages‟,  Review  of  Economics  and 
Statistics, 91(2): 363–376. 
Dustmann, C. and U. Schönberg (2010), „What makes firm-based apprenticeship schemes work? The 
role  of  commitment  to  training  provision‟.  Working  paper,  Department  of  Economics, 
University College London. 
Edding  Commission  (1974),  Kosten  und  Finanzierung  der  auβerschulischen  beruflichen  Bildung 
(Costs  and  Financing  of  Non-School  Vocational  Education  and  Training),  Final  Report, 
Sachverständigenkommission. Bielefeld: W. Bertelsman Verlag. 
Field, S., K. Hoeckel, V. Kis and M. Kuczera (2009), Learning for jobs: OECD policy review of 
vocational education and training: initial report, Paris: OECD. 
FSO  (1998),  Mikrozensus  Familie  in  der  Schweiz  1994/95.  Neuchâtel:  Swiss  Federal  Statistical 
Office. 
FSO (2000), Swiss Census 2000, Neuchâtel: Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
FSO  (2004),  Die  Schweizerische  Arbeitskräfteerhebung  (SAKE)  2004,  Neuchâtel:  Swiss  Federal 
Statistical Office. 29 
 
FSO (2005), Betriebszählung 2005, Neuchâtel: Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
Hamilton, B., J.F. Thisse and Y. Zenou (2000), „Wage competition with heterogeneous workers and 
firms‟, Journal of Labor Economics, 18 (3), 453-472. 
Hirsch, B. T. and E.J. Schumacher (1995), „Monopsony power and relative wages in the labor market 
for nurses‟, Journal of Health Economics, 14, 443-476. 
Hirsch, B., T. Schank and C. Schnabel (2010), „Differences in labor supply to monopsonistic firms 
and  the  gender  pay  gap:  an  empirical  analysis  using  linked  employer-employee  data  from 
Germany‟, Journal of Labor Economics 28(2), 291-330. 
Hoeckel,  K.,  S.  Field  and  W.N.  Grubb  (2009),  Learning  for  jobs.  OECD  reviews  of  vocational 
education and training – Switzerland, Paris: OECD. 
LaFountain,  C.  (2005),  „Where  do  firms  locate?  Testing  competing  models  of  agglomeration‟, 
Journal of Urban Economics, 58(2), 338-366. 
Leuven, E. (2005), „The economics of private sector training: a survey of the literature‟, Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 19(1), 91-111. 
Link, C.R. and J.H. Landon (1976), „Market structure, nonpecuniary factors and professional salaries: 
registered nurses‟, Journal of Economics and Business, 28(2), 151-55. 
Manning,  A.  (2003a),  „The  real  thin  theory:  monopsony  in  modern  labour  markets‟,  Labour 
Economics, 10(2003), 105-131. 
Manning, A. (2003b), Monopsony in motion: imperfect competition in labour markets, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Manning, A. (2006), „A generalised model of monopsony‟, Economic Journal, 116, 84-100 
Manning, A. (2010), „Imperfect competition in the labour market‟, Discussion Paper 981, Centre for 
Economic Performance, London School of Economics. 
Marsden, D.W. and P. Ryan (1991), „The structuring of youth pay and employment in six European 
economies‟, in P. Ryan, P. Garonna and R.C. Edwards (eds), The Problem of Youth. London: 
Macmillan, 82-115. 
Muehlemann, S., S.C. Wolter, M. Fuhrer and A. Wüest (2007), „Lehrlingsausbildung – ökonomisch 
betrachtet (Apprentice Training Considered from the Economic Standpoint)‟, Zurich: Rüegger 
Verlag. 
Muehlemann, S., H. Pfeifer, G. Walden, F. Wenzelmann and S. C. Wolter (2010), „The financing of 
apprenticeship training in the light of labour market regulations‟, Labour Economics, 17(5), 
751-874. 
OPET (2009), Vocational education and training in Switzerland 2009 – facts and figures, Berne: 
Federal Office for Professional Education and Technology. 
Potterat,  J.  (2006),  Kosten  und  Nutzen  der  Berufsbildung  aus  Sicht  der  Betriebe  im  Jahr  2004, 
Neuchâtel: Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
Ransom, M.R. and R.L. Oaxaca (2010), „New Market Power Models and Sex Differences in Pay‟, 
Journal of Labor Economics, 28(2), 267-289. 
Ransom,  M.R.  and  D.P.  Sims  (2010),  „Estimating  the  firm‟s  labor  supply  curve  in  a  “New 
Monopsony” framework: schoolteachers in Missouri‟, Journal of Labor Economics 28(2), 331-
355. 
Robinson, J.F. (1933), The economics of imperfect competition, London: St. Martin‟s. 
Ryan,  P.  (1984),  „Job  training,  employment  practices  and  the  large  enterprise:  the  case  of  costly 
transferable skills‟, in P. Osterman (ed), Internal Labour Markets, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
191-230. 
Ryan,  P.  (2010),  „Apprentice  strikes,  pay  structure,  and  training  in  twentieth  century  UK 
metalworking industry‟, in C. Brown, B. Eichengreen, and M. Reich (eds), Labor in the Era of 
Globalization, Cambridge: CUP, 317-53. 
Ryan, P., K. Wagner, S. Teuber and U. Backes-Gellner (2010), „Trainee Pay in Britain, Germany and 
Switzerland: Markets and Institutions‟, Research Paper 96, Oxford: SKOPE. 
Sachverständigenkommission  (1974),  Kosten  und  Finanzierung  der  ausserschulischen  beruflichen 
Bildung, Bielefeld: Bertelsmann. 
Salop, S.C. (1979), „Monopolistic competition with outside goods‟, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 
141-156. 30 
 
SKBF  (2010),  Bildungsbericht  Schweiz  2010,  Aarau:  Schweizerische  Koordinationsstelle  für 
Bildungsforschung. 
Staiger, D.O., J. Spetz and C.S. Phibbs (2010), „Is there monopsony in the labor market? evidence 
from a natural experiment‟, Journal of Labor Economics 28(2), 211-236. 
Stevens, M. (1994), „A theoretical model of on-the-job training with imperfect competition‟, Oxford 
Economic Papers, 46(4), 537-62. 
Stevens, M. (1999), „Human capital theory and UK vocational training policy‟, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 15(1), 16-32. 
Stevens, M. (2001), „Should firms be required to pay for vocational training?‟, Economic Journal, 
111(July), 485-505. 
Winkelmann, R. (1996), „Less skilled labor and wage determination: An empirical investigation for 
Germany‟, Journal of Population Economics, 9(2), 159-171. 
Wolter, S.C. and P. Ryan (2010), „Apprenticeship‟, in R. Hanushek, S. Machin and L. Wössmann 




   31 
 
 
Table A1: Definitions of variables 
 Variable  Definition  
Pay  Mean annual pre-tax base pay in CHF (of apprentices, averaged across all 
years  of  training,  or  unskilled
a  employees,  or  skilled
b  employees)  in  the 
occupation  and  establishment,  calculated  from  its  monthly  counterpart, 
including employees‟ (and apprentices‟) social security contributions, but not 
including  13th  and/or  14th  monthly  pay,  other  non-regular  payments 
(performance bonuses, etc.) and employers‟ social security contributions 
Relative pay   Ratio  of  mean  pay  in  two  of  the  three  categories  (apprentices,  skilled 
employees and unskilled employees) 
Establishment size  Number of employees (apprentices excluded) 
Hours of formal training per trainee per 
week 
Total hours per week that skilled workers cannot work productively because 
they are instructing apprentices 
Number  of  establishments  per  hectare 
(own sector) 
Number of establishments in local labour market in the same two-digit sector 
/ Area of local labour market in hectares 
Number  of  establishments  per  hectare 
(all sectors) 
Total number of establishments in local labour market / Area of local labour 
market in hectares 
 
Notes: a. Employees who have not completed any type of post-compulsory schooling. 
b. Employees who have completed apprenticeship training (i.e., a vocational qualification at upper secondary 
level) for the occupation in which they are working. 
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Table A2: Number of establishments within local labour markets by two-digit sector 
Sector  Mean  Median
a
  S.D.  Min  Max 
Mining and quarrying  19.6  19  11.0  0  50 
Manufacture of food products and beverages  140.7  120  95.7  3  376 
Manufacture of tobacco products  0.6  0  1.3  0  6 
Manufacture of textiles and textile products  40.9  28  38.4  0  178 
Manufacture of apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  57.5  41  55.2  0  246 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 
14.4  15  9.0  0  34 
Manufacture of wood, and wood and cork products, except 
furniture; manufacture of straw and plaiting materials 
314.2  278  191.7  22  913 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products  15.0  10  14.1  0  52 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  295.4  195  301.8  1  1390 
Manufacture  of  coke,  refined  petroleum  products  and 
nuclear fuel 
0.6  0  1.0  0  5 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  55.6  42  49.9  0  231 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  47.7  39  39.3  0  170 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  84.9  70  59.8  3  277 
Manufacture of basic metals  16.1  13  12.3  0  52 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment 
431.1  369  321.8  3  1440 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  196.6  159  153.0  1  691 
Manufacture of office machinery, data processing devices  8.2  7  7.8  0  32 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  63.9  50  59.7  0  287 
Manufacture  of  radio,  television  and  communication 
equipment and apparatus 
39.7  30  38.0  0  205 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks 
192.2  146  166.1  0  759 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  10.6  8  9.7  0  39 
Manufacture of other transport equipment  22.5  21  17.3  0  75 
Manufacture  of  furniture,  jewelry,  musical  instruments, 
sports goods, games and toys and other goods 
214.8  174  169.7  7  718 
Recycling  21.3  17  15.9  0  67 
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply  35.1  33  18.8  3  91 
Collection, purification and distribution of water  13.7  12  10.3  0  55 
Construction  1906.0  1662  1350.6  60  6660 
Sale,  maintenance  and  repair  of  motor  vehicles  and 
motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
830.6  695  614.5  15  3062 33 
 
Wholesale  trade  and  commission  trade,  except  of  motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
1193.6  898  1166.5  11  5906 
Retail  trade,  except  of  motor  vehicles  and  motorcycles; 
repair of personal and household goods 
2829.9  2057  2147.1  79  10205 
Hotels and restaurants  1363.7  1172  836.5  102  4161 
Land transport; transport via pipelines  445.7  353  353.2  14  1691 
Water transport  5.1  3  8.2  0  39 
Air transport  13.2  4  25.4  0  101 
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies  239.5  163  239.5  6  1092 
Post and telecommunications  274.5  233  180.8  20  828 
Monetary intermediation  245.0  176  246.3  9  1115 
Insurance (except compulsory social security)  165.8  128  119.1  6  554 
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation  214.9  137  252.0  3  1128 
Real estate activities  262.8  173  263.6  4  1292 
Rental of machinery and equipment without operators and 
of personal and household goods 
56.7  44  51.4  0  237 
Computing services and related activities  721.5  449  874.4  6  4310 
Research and development  31.8  20  32.4  0  114 
Other business activities  3533.1  2368  3767.8  47  18305 
Public  administration  and  defense;  compulsory  social 
security 
498.4  421  331.0  24  1483 
Education  865.4  686  679.2  26  3230 
Health, veterinary and social work  1487.5  979  1274.7  15  5680 
Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities  102.9  82  75.0  6  365 
Activities of membership organizations n.e.c.  326.1  221  262.4  11  1087 
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities  432.7  275  403.2  11  1844 
Other service activities  804.5  592  652.7  13  3012 
Mean across sectors (in-sector establishments only)  415.6  311.5  354.4  10.4  1685.1 
Mean  number  of  establishments  (all  sectors)  per  local 
labour market  22,175  17,196  17,845.7  1188  85,746 
Notes: a. rounded up to the nearest integer where a tie occurs. 
 
 